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An optimal growth pattern requires pro-growth optimal institutions and culture. In an
optimal growth pattern, entrepreneurship and innovation are facilitated. In contrast, in
case  of distortions in the development of institutions and culture and distortions in their
coevolution, a permanent growth stagnation prototype can appear, with distorted creative
destruction process causing weak entrepreneurship and innovation activity. At a policy con-
cern, attention should be redirected to the planning and implementation of pro-growth
structural changes with reference to institutions and culture that would take into account
their  coevolution process. Otherwise, we must rely on the importation of growth (i.e.,
inwards capital ﬂows or incoming innovation), forming a pro-growth but exogenous pro-
totype that could promote growth, entrepreneurship and innovation.
©  2016 Journal of Innovation & Knowledge. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
De  un  prototipo  de  crecimiento  óptimo  al  estancamiento:  el  papel  de  las
instituciones  y  la  cultura
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Un patrón de crecimiento óptimo require de unas instituciones y cultura partidarias del
crecimiento. En un patrón de crecimiento óptimo se facilitan el emprendimiento y la inno-
vación. Por el contrario, la aparición de distorsiones en la coevolución de las instituciones
y  la cultura puede causar un patrón de crecimiento de estancamiento permanente, con un
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proceso de destrucción creativa que daría lugar a un emprendimiento e innovación débiles.
En  cuanto a las políticas, deberían centrarse en la planiﬁcación e implementación de cam-
bios estructurales en materia cultural y en las instituciones que favorezcan el crecimiento
teniendo en cuenta su proceso de coevolución. De lo contrario, debemos depender de la
importación de crecimiento (ﬂujos de capital entrante o innovación extranjera en el país),
creando un prototipo pro-crecimiento pero exógeno que podría promover el crecimiento, el
emprendimiento y la innovación.
© 2016 Journal of Innovation & Knowledge. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. Este es
un artículo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY-NC-ND
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Innovación
Introduction
The function of economies depends heavily on the inter-
connection of prevailing institutions and preferences. When
institutions and culture are activated in an optimal growth
pattern, innovation and entrepreneurship are facilitated. Con-
versely, in case of (a) distortions in the development of
institutions and culture and (b) distortions in their coevo-
lution, growth stagnation can appear, causing strong and
permanent distortions in entrepreneurship and innovation.
Within an evolutionary concept, two distinct and ini-
tial characteristics can seriously distort the optimal function
of economies and how they generate innovations: extrac-
tive institutions and non-market mechanisms for resource
allocation. This paper aims to prove that two characteris-
tics, along with the coevolution of institutions and culture,
cause additional effects on institutions (generating system-
atic risk) and culture (such as for lack of diversiﬁcation of
investment behavior and idiosyncratic cultural traits consis-
tent with uncertainty avoidance, in-group collectivism, high
discount preferences and loss aversion). Those second and
third round effects maintain the initial distorting forces. In
other words, extracting institutions and non-market mecha-
nisms of resource allocation maintain their inﬂuence together
with the systematic risk and idiosyncratic culture. Thus,
an endogenous and perpetual deviation of the optimal pat-
tern is generated, which can be characterized as a stagnated
growth prototype that negatively affects the creative destruc-
tion process. This prototype thus performs poorly in terms
of entrepreneurship and innovation. The most common way
(but not the only one) of breaking up this stagnated prototype
is through importing growth (i.e., capital inﬂows or innova-
tion), but those requirements are not included in the interests
of the present paper.
Firstly, in the second section, the optimum growth
paradigm from the innovation perspective is presented,
together with the Schumpeterian perspective on institutions
and culture. In the third section, the endogeneity and the
institutions-culture nexus are presented. In the fourth section,Please cite this article in press as: Petrakis, P. E., et al. From an optimal to
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the inﬂuences – related to institutions – that lead to devi-
ations from the optimal pattern are presented. Meanwhile,
in the ﬁfth section, the relevant inﬂuences related to culture
are analyzed. In the sixth section, the concept of coevolutionof institutions and culture is presented, while the stagnated
growth prototype is described in seventh section. The paper
ends with conclusions.
The  optimum  paradigm  and  the  Schumpeterian
perspective  on  institutions  and  culture
Walras (1874) developed a general equilibrium model con-
cerning the micro-foundations of price formation. The basic
assumptions of the Walrasian paradigm are: (a) the exis-
tence of perfect competition, (b) resource allocation is Pareto
optimal, (c) the existence of institutions that foster eco-
nomic growth, (d) the absence of systematic risk, and (e) the
growth preferences of individuals and ﬁrms (i.e., growth ori-
ented cultural background dimensions) are non-idiosyncratic.
The key assumption of perfect competition in conjunction
with Pareto’s optimal allocation of resources in the Walrasian
paradigm (an assumption that generally exists in the neoclas-
sical prototype) ensures a speciﬁc context of behavior and
preferences, thus forming the way in which economic insti-
tutions function. Simultaneously, under perfect information
conditions, markets clear smoothly and without transaction
costs due to the complete contracting assumption.
The Walrasian paradigm rejects interactive relations
between agents. Pricing cannot incorporate the informa-
tion available, since some aspects of transactions are not
expressed in enforceable contracts (Bowles & Gintis, 2000).
Additionally, the role of entrepreneurship and innovation in
the Walrasian paradigm is very weak. Thus, a Schumpeterian
framework is needed to locate the emergence of innovation
and entrepreneurship.
Schumpeter (1921, 1939) based his analysis on the exis-
tence of a perfectly competitive economy, presenting a
stationary equilibrium and thus, a perfect competitive equi-
librium, without proﬁts, interest rates, savings, investments
and unintentional unemployment. However, since this is a
capitalistic economy, it does not stand still. Innovation is the
element that causes imbalance and simultaneously causes
an economy to evolve. According to Schumpeter, balance is a a stagnated growth prototype: The role of institutions and culture.
01.011
concept introduced to explain the imbalance caused by inno-
vation (Schumpeter, 1939). Transition into dynamic economic
growth is explained in this way, and is disconnected from pro-
ductive factor growth. The Schumpeterian growth model is
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ased on three main ideas (Aghion, Ufuk, & Howitt, 2015): (i)
t is about growth generated by innovations; (ii) innovations
esult from entrepreneurial investments that are themselves
otivated by the prospects of monopoly rents; and (iii) innova-
ions replace old technologies. In other words, growth involves
reative destruction.
According to Schumpeter, institutions also play a key role.
e considers them responsible for the emergence of certain
ehaviors, such that they can partly be seen as the crystal-
ization of individuals’ behaviors (Festré & Garrouste, 2008:
79). Schumpeter (1934: 60–61) also stated that “economic
ociology deals with institutions,” and so contrasts with eco-
omic theory, which deals with purely economic phenomena
nd mechanisms. In the Schumpeterian competition scheme,
nnovation plays a key role in economic change through
ncreasing the efﬁciency of the economic and institutional
tructure (Ulgen, 2011). Furthermore, Swedberg (2002: 250)
rgued that for Schumpeter, institutions are necessary to vig-
rous capitalism.
Additionally, Schumpeter assumed that the preferences of
ocieties are generally incomplete, and that learning, expe-
ience, innovation, and social environment mold the desires
f society. Schumpeter deals with how preferences are deter-
ined and concludes that we  resolve ignorance regarding our
njoyment of speciﬁc outcomes by using not only our past
xperiences, but also the revealed preferences of other similar
ut more  experienced consumers (Jonsson, 1994). In the ﬁeld
f consumer behaviors and preferences, Schumpeter adopts a
ategorical attitude, according to which producers’ behaviors
nd activities are important because they have the strength to
nﬂuence and change consumers’ preferences (Croitoru, 2012).
Risk obviously prevails in the context of Schumpeterian
nalysis since the likelihood of an innovation being successful
s not predictable. Therefore, the existence of non-systematic
isk conditions is considered important, given that risk deter-
ines the possibility of innovation success. According to
maga  (2014), risk is part of Schumpeterian creative destruc-
ion and allows the elimination of inefﬁcient institutions. To
he extent that risk does not destabilize the whole economic
ystem, weak institutions should be subject to resolution or
llowed to fail. Thus non-systematic risk is essential for acti-
ating entrepreneurship provided it can be diversiﬁed and can
oexist with low systematic risk.
ndogeneity  and  the  institutions/culture  nexus
he above optimal growth pattern cannot often be met. We
onsider idiosyncratic institutions to be one of the most sig-
iﬁcant reasons for deviations from the optimal pattern.
There are two basic questions to be answered before
tudying the distorted patterns. The ﬁrst one refers to the
ndogeneity or exogeneity of institutions and culture evo-
ution, while the second one refers to the causality and the
mpact direction between institutions and culture. More pre-
isely, the ﬁrst question regards the initial creation of thePlease cite this article in press as: Petrakis, P. E., et al. From an optimal to
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istorted prototype. The second question regards the impact
riority between institutions and culture.
The possible situation in which an economy prevails at an
ptimal pattern and then it is transformed to an idiosyncraticw l e d g e x x x (2 0 1 6) xxx–xxx 3
one does exist but is not discussed in the present paper. The
present paper accepts an a priori pre-existence of the initial
institutions conditions of extractive nature and non-market
allocation of resources. All other kinds of developments arise
as endogenous reﬂections of this particular initial pre-existing
condition. Historically, the ﬁrst created economies – most of
them appeared in the 17th and 18th century – which were
byproducts of colonial presence (Africa and Latin America)
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) can be considered as good exam-
ples of the deviated pattern we analyze in this paper. The same
is valid for the sovereign generated peripheral countries of
Europe and Latin America, almost at the same time periods.
The relationship between Institutions and Culture is an
extremely interesting issue for the international literature
(Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Bisin & Verdier, 2001; Bowles, 1998).
The conclusions of that research state that there exists a two-
way inﬂuence. However, since, the initial assumption of the
present paper is the pre-existence of the particular idiosyn-
cratic institutions, we accept the coevolution of institutions
and culture as a second round effect.
Deviations  from  the  optimal  pattern:  the  case  of
institutions
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) point out that what matters
most in why some economies fail and others succeed in not
only the factors identiﬁed by earlier authors, such as eco-
nomic policies, geography, culture, or value systems, but also
rather in institutions, speciﬁcally the political institutions that
determine economic institutions. Economic institutions most
strongly affect all kinds of human relations, whether political,
social or economic (North, 1990).
Institutions are classiﬁed as “extractive” when they impede
economic growth, and as “inclusive” when they promote it
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). In societies with extractive
institutions, entrepreneurship is obstructed, systematic risk
is increased and market functioning and efﬁciency are ham-
pered.
In case of recession or negative economic impacts, extrac-
tive institutions are expected to generate distorted inﬂuences
on the creative destruction process. More  precisely, under
recession conditions, existing production structures are dis-
credited. This fact, together with the existence of institutions
that prevent the formation of new production structures (i.e.,
failed bankruptcy procedures), preserves failed production
prototypes and results in these problematic situations becom-
ing perpetual. In other words, failed businesses live longer
and the emergence of new businesses is not accelerated. The
consequence is that the production of innovation is slowed
and the economy experiences increased systematic risk since
diversiﬁcation does not work.
The theory of the ﬁrm (Coase, 1937) introduces the notion
that markets and ﬁrms (hierarchies) are two  alternative
institutional forms that govern transactions. Coase (1937) a stagnated growth prototype: The role of institutions and culture.
01.011
argues that ﬁrms may replace markets when the costs of
internal transactions within an organization are lower than
those of market transactions. For Coase (1937), transaction
costs add inefﬁciencies to the market. Williamson deﬁnes
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transaction costs as the “costs of running the economic
system” (Williamson, 1985).
Williamson (1973), in “Market and Hierarchies”, argues that
a hierarchy exists “mainly because of uncertainty and oppor-
tunism, though bounded rationality is involved as well. It exists when
true underlying circumstances relevant to the transaction, or related
set of transactions, are known to one or more parties but cannot
be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others”. When hierar-
chies are spread along the whole range of economic activities,
they increase uncertainty and, conceptually, systematic risk.
Moreover, transaction costs deprive the real economy of
resources and are not conducive to optimal resource allo-
cation. High transaction costs lead to market failures and
limit efﬁcient resource utilization, increasing the likelihood of
systematic risk. Therefore, hierarchies and transaction costs
distort resource allocation and increase systematic risk. Also,
in free markets – as already mentioned – transaction costs
are zero and market exchanges occur in a competitive envi-
ronment. In general, any effort to integrate transaction costs
in mainstream economics – based on the general equilibrium
framework – involves working outside the equilibrium frame-
work (Williamson, 1981).
Factors that enhance the formation of idiosyncratic institu-
tions (hierarchies and high transaction costs) are coordination
failures, information asymmetries and evolution path depen-
dence. Coordination failures occur when the actions of an
individual (or a ﬁrm) generate externalities that affect other
members of an economic system. Consequently, externalities
that are not taken into account bear economic costs, leading
the economy toward an equilibrium point that deviates by the
Canonical Pattern. Another crucial point is the fact that infor-
mation asymmetries in turn affect resource allocation within
an economy and make it difﬁcult to reach market efﬁciency.
Moreover, the elimination of such information asymmetries
requires contract between assignor and assignee, which cre-
ates an additional operating expense for the economy.
The prevalence of hierarchical structures in the produc-
tion process creates obstacles to the orientation of available
resources to more  productive destinations, making it difﬁcult
for economies to adapt or slowing their adaptation to the cre-
ative destruction that is essential to economic renaissance.
In relation to evolution path dependence, we assume that
history still plays a decisive role in various everyday aspects of
human existence, such as preferences, decisions and behav-
iors. However, it is interesting to understand how preferences
are formed and, especially, the extent to which they are evo-
lution path dependent. In so far as preferences are formed
by initial experiences, later preferences are path dependent
(Hoefﬂer, Ariely, & West, 2006). The factors that govern how
previous experiences affect people’s later preferences can
be sought in drive anchoring and adjustment mechanisms
(Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997).
Evolution path dependence demonstrates the problem of
economic science and more  speciﬁcally the classical eco-
nomics problem of efﬁcient market functioning. However, in
most cases, institutions cannot ensure property rights andPlease cite this article in press as: Petrakis, P. E., et al. From an optimal to
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economic governance. Both property rights and the manner
in which an economy functions result from a path depen-
dent procedure with elements of historical legacy. Based on
this concept, the existence of high systematic risk is favored w l e d g e x x x (2 0 1 6) xxx–xxx
in societies with historical aspects that distort the property
rights network. Additionally, distortion of property rights cre-
ates disincentives to proceeding with business initiatives and
generally limits market efﬁciency.
Deviations  from  the  optimal  pattern:  the  case  of
culture
The concepts of culture and preferences illustrate how mem-
bers of a society react to everyday concerns. “Culture is deﬁned
as a set of shared values, beliefs and expected behaviors”
(Hayton, Gerard, & Zahra, 2002). The cultural characteris-
tics of societies reﬂect psychological social stereotypes that
have been created over time and are prior human con-
structs to current transactions and institutions (Petrakis &
Kostis, 2013). Cultural background is conceptualized as a set
of “shared knowledge” consisting of (a) taught thought pro-
cedures, (b) belief, behavior and value constructs and (c)
underlying theories of the physical and social worlds. Thus,
cultural background is constituted by cultural syndromes that
can be considered intermediate mental constructions that
originate from the distant past and connect it with the present
(Hong, 2009). The concept of preferences works similarly to
that of culture. As deﬁned by Bowles (1998, 2004): “Preferences
are reasons for behavior, that is, attributes of individuals –
other than beliefs and capacities – that account for the actions
they take in a given situation”. Preferences are assisted by
three district procedures which include: (a) a list of prefer-
ences, (b) rules of ordering and (c) the criteria of optimal
choices. These procedures are posited at the ﬁnal stages of
an action preparation and are required for action implementa-
tion. Thus, they are bearing all the inﬂuences from culture and
beliefs. In this paper, when we refer to preferences, we  imply
all the inﬂuences that are exercised by culture and beliefs
as well. Although there are economists that assume the exo-
geneity of preferences (Fehr & Hoff, 2011), it is now accepted
that preferences are endogenous in nature. However, there
are external inﬂuences originated by geographical, biological
origin, etc. Bowles (2004) argues for the endogeneity of prefer-
ences with respect to institutions as a means to determine the
effects of human incentives in the formation of institutions.
The contradictions in the deviations refer to three sub-
groups of preferences and behaviors: (a) investment behavior,
(b) cultural treats and behavior and (c) loss aversion behavior.
Non-diversiﬁcation  idiosyncratic  investment  behavior
Diversiﬁcation is also important to the economy, since diversi-
ﬁcation of investment and production is essential to economic
growth. This statement has been much analyzed in the
economic literature. Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets (1971) sug-
gests that national economic growth can be deﬁned as a
long-term rise in capacity to supply increasingly diverse eco-
nomic goods to the population. This argument is further
empowered by Grossman and Helpman (1992), who  claim that a stagnated growth prototype: The role of institutions and culture.
01.011
for an economy to grow, it must produce an ever-increasing
quantity, quality and variety of goods and services.
An economy is diversiﬁed when it has incomes from many
different sources that are not directly related to one another
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Shayah, 2015). If national income depends on the production
f one product, the national standard of living can ﬂuctuate
ith the price of that product. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) show
he pattern of sectoral diversiﬁcation along the development
ath, indicating that countries ﬁrst diversify, in the sense that
conomic activity is spread relatively equally across sectors,
ut relatively late in the development process they start spe-
ializing again.
Osakwe (2007) ﬁnds a more  speciﬁc effect of product diver-
iﬁcation connecting diversiﬁcation with risk. He points out
hat policymakers in developing countries are interested in
iversifying their production and export structure to reduce
ulnerability to external shocks. This is in line with Ramey
nd Ramey (1995), who note that more  diversiﬁed economies
re less volatile in terms of outputs, while lower output
olatility is associated with higher economic growth. Owner-
anagers often employ a diversiﬁcation strategy to reduce
he risks related to employment and reputation, since they
an decrease ﬁrm ﬁnancial risk by diversifying into unrelated
ctivities (Amihud & Lev, 1981). Furthermore, intra-industry
roduct diversiﬁcation engenders a trade-off between poten-
ial risks of exceeding reasonable capacity to effectively offer
iverse products and the possible demand externalities gen-
rated by offering a broad range of products (Kang, Lee, & Huh,
010). Ballivian and Sickles (1994) investigate the relationship
etween risk-avoidance behavior and economic jointness in a
ultioutput technology, and notice that diversiﬁcation in pro-
uction can have several explanations, such as jointness, cost
omplementarities and risk-avoidance.
Additionally, systematic risk can be mitigated by diver-
iﬁcation. Montgomery and Singh (1984) as well as Bettis
nd Mahajan (1985) associate the concept of diversiﬁcation
trategy with the level of systematic risk, expressed through
ystematic risk beta (taken as a proxy for market risk), and
onclude that diversiﬁcation increases corporate returns and
ecreases systematic risk. Additionally, it is argued that ﬁrms
an signiﬁcantly minimize their risk by diversifying into sim-
lar businesses rather than into identical or very different
usinesses (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994).
Economies that do not diversify their investment plans
nd production are more  vulnerable to external shocks and
ack easy escape routes in response to economic downturns
r other external shocks. In contrast, economies that diver-
ify their investment plans and production are sufﬁciently
rotected against external shocks or economic downturns.
iversiﬁcation thus enables economies to maintain the speed
f creative destruction and associated innovation.
he  idiosyncratic  cultural  background  and  loss  aversion
diosyncratic/stagnated cultural background can be charac-
erized by the existence of speciﬁc forces that act in a
eculiar manner forming individual preferences. Persistent
igh systematic risk leads to the formation of an idiosyncratic
ultural background. This kind of cultural background may
e represented through the analysis of three dimensions: (a)Please cite this article in press as: Petrakis, P. E., et al. From an optimal to
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ncertainty avoidance, (b) in-group collectivism and (c) high
ime discount preferences.
Given that decisions are made by agents, systematic risk
ffects particular characteristics of the cultural background.w l e d g e x x x (2 0 1 6) xxx–xxx 5
Human behavior is deﬁned by interaction between individu-
als and their external environment, generally leading to the
formation of personality traits, beliefs and perceptions.
Uncertainty avoidance refers to a lack of social tolerance for
uncertainty and doubt. The existence of risk and uncertainty
entails that estimates about the future cannot be fully reliable,
since there is insufﬁcient information to be creditworthy in
attributing the probabilities of the realization of the various
results (Petrakis, 2014).
Everyday stimuli form individual’s reaction and behavior
mechanisms. Similarly, risk perception (Brehmer, 1987) and
risk judgments are associated with a cognitive process of pro-
cessing available information (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000).
Events and their consequences are important to our percep-
tions of risk (Drottz-Sjöberg, 1991; Sjoberg, 2000).
The prevalence of high economic risks leads individuals
to protect themselves against risk by demonstrating uncer-
tainty avoidance behaviors. Besides the obvious source of risk
perception, there is a belief that risk is a social phenomenon
that cannot be examined individually (Boholm, 1996). As risk
perception is not formed in a social vacuum, one cannot
account for how people perceive risk without considering the
social context. Risk perception is a social and cultural phe-
nomenon (Douglas, 1978) that is not dominated exclusively
by particular human personality characteristics, needs or
preferences.
Acceptance of uncertainty and rate of innovation are
negatively correlated (Hofstede, 1980; Shane, 1993, 1995). Will-
ingness to assume entrepreneurial risk, long-term planning
and acceptance of changes are basically cultural traits that
are boosting innovation (Rothwell & Wissema, 1986). Cultures
that reward creativity and motivate their members to achieve
personal progress tend to record better innovation results.
Furthermore, culture can be seen as a long-term strate-
gic instrument for innovation and competitiveness (Petrakis,
Kostis, & Valsamis, 2015). Restated, in risk-avoiding societies,
low implementation of creative destruction is expected, since
such societies avoid engaging in failed and inefﬁcient activi-
ties.
The second dimension refers to in-group collectivism. Peo-
ple have a group mindset and look after the beneﬁt of the
group, often suppressing their personal achievements for the
interests of the group (Petrakis, 2014). In-group collectivism
can be seen essentially as individuals’ resistance to join a
group for feelings of safety, for protection against uncertainty,
or to ensure access to material resources and social support
(Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988).
In contrast, privacy and innovation potential are positively
correlated, since the more  freely an individual can express
their opinions, the greater the possibility of exploring new
ideas (Barnett, 1953). Individualistic societies tend to encour-
age their members to express their opinions and provide
the freedom necessary for creativity. Furthermore, weak links
among members of individualistic societies promote easier
information dissemination relative to collectivist societies,
whose members utilize information at the intragroup level a stagnated growth prototype: The role of institutions and culture.
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and prevent its dissemination. Mental attributes such as inde-
pendence, achievement and innovation encouragement are
commonly found among individuals inhabiting individualistic
societies (Shane, 1992).
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Finally, the third dimension of idiosyncratic cultural
background, high time discount preferences concern the pref-
erence of the members of a society for evaluating the present
more  highly than the future. Generally, time occupies the
core of the cultural background and is responsible for shap-
ing behaviors and perspectives. Individuals make predictions
based on the knowledge, perceptions and beliefs that they
form during their lives and by partaking in social groups
(Nurmi, 1989). In an uncertain and high-risk environment,
members of society tend to be cautious about their future deci-
sions, and seek to delay the commitment of resources and
effort. When such individuals are oriented toward the present
rather than future, innovation is prevented. Innovations
require long-term thinking and planning since they rarely
yield short-term beneﬁts. Consequently, societies that are
more  oriented to the present are not interested in innovations
after an external shock or economic downturn. Such societies
exhibit destruction together with an absence of creativity.
Thus, creative destruction slows down in such societies.
Loss aversion assertion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) – one
of the elements of the prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman,
1991) – implies that people are twice as sensitive to risks as to
gains. That is, the absolute subjective value of a speciﬁc loss
exceeds the absolute subjective value of an equivalent gain
(Ert & Erev, 2010).
The main point here is that loss aversion behavior can
be inﬂated by high systematic risk levels and idiosyn-
cratic/stagnated cultural background. Several studies examine
loss aversion in choices among high stakes (hypothetical)
gambles (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Haridon, 2008; Abdellaoui,
Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv, 2007). The results are consistent with
loss aversion, but could not be differentiated from mere  risk
aversion, which is typically observed in decisions that involve
high stakes (Holt & Laury, 2002).
Breuer, Riesener, and Salzmann (2014) suggest that indi-
vidualism, which is linked to overconﬁdence and excessive
optimism, signiﬁcantly and positively affects ﬁnancial risk
aversion. They ﬁnd evidence consistent with low levels of
individualism being important in explaining the limited par-
ticipation puzzle. Furthermore, Chan and Saqib (2013) posit
that loss aversion attenuates under time pressure. More  pre-
cisely, they point out that, relative to the situation without
time constraints, people under time pressure no longer con-
sider the hedonic impact of losses to exceed that of gains, but
instead see the two as roughly equal. This is because people
consider time a resource, meaning the loss of time under time
pressure is a loss of a resource, placing them on the locally
convex portion of the value function. From this point, the
hedonic impact of any further loss diminishes relative to deci-
sions based on the status quo. In other words, loss aversion
attenuates.
Brennan and Lo (2011) point out that when reproductive
risk is systematic (i.e., correlated among individuals within a
given generation), some seemingly irrational behaviors, such
as probability matching and loss aversion, become evolution-
arily dominant.Please cite this article in press as: Petrakis, P. E., et al. From an optimal to
Journal of Innovation & Knowledge (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jik.2016.
In loss-averse societies people tend to strongly prefer
avoiding losses to acquiring gains, and thus do not engage in
long-term risky innovations. Under these circumstances the
adjustment involved in creative destruction is slow. w l e d g e x x x (2 0 1 6) xxx–xxx
The  coevolution  of  institutions  and  culture  in  a
stagnated  growth  prototype
In contrast to the Walrasian paradigm, the evolutionary
paradigm is based on three key components: (a) structures
of social interactions, (b) agent’s behavior and culture, and
(c) technology. It is based on a diversiﬁed and more  realis-
tic concept, which is an evolutionary process of preferences,
behaviors and economic institutions.
The major issue is whether culture evolves in a manner
that matches institutions. Institutions should be compatible
with preferences. Otherwise, they will be unable to support
their cause, leading to conﬂicts where institutions and culture
do not match.
Roland (2004) classiﬁes institutions into two  categories
based on their evolution velocity: fast-moving institutions
(political institutions) and slow-moving institutions (culture,
norms and stereotypes). Endogenous interactions among
institutions and preferences and their coevolution are impor-
tant during economic evolution (Tabellini, 2008).
It is difﬁcult to understand how institutions coexist with
preferences because institutions are endogenously selected by
individuals and because institutions and preferences coevolve
(Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, & Shleifer, 2010; Tabellini, 2008).
The  perpetuating  stagnated  growth  prototype
The occurrence of new institutions is associated with cultural
innovation (Bowles, 2009). However, such institutions usually
result from many  complex processes, which are not performed
jointly, but are individual in terms of time and space. The
adoption of new preferences is a process that reﬂects changes
in human behavior that result from various inﬂuences on indi-
viduals (Bowles, 1998). Complementarity in the development
of both culture and institutions is necessary for the long-term
survival of institutions.
In the above analysis, the evolution of social preferences
structure is very important because it makes small “original”
differences prevalent and perpetual. Thus, population is con-
stantly in a situation where inﬂuences from the past affect
individual culture and institutional evolution. However, the
coevolution of culture and institutions is not synchronized in
most cases. Incompatibility may be affected by time course, for
example where institutions reach an equilibrium that is com-
patible with equilibrium preferences, but this occurs so when
preferences have been modiﬁed, and vice versa. However,
incompatibility may also result from incomplete transforma-
tion of preferences into institutions that may occur for many
reasons (such as ineffective political process or hidden prefer-
ences).
Summarizing, the two distinct characteristics, namely
extractive institutions and non-market mechanisms of
resource allocation, have been shown to have second round
effects on institutions (generation of systematic risk) and a stagnated growth prototype: The role of institutions and culture.
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preferences (lack of diversiﬁcation in investment behavior
and idiosyncratic cultural background). The formation of the
second round idiosyncratic institutions and culture perpetu-
ates the existence of extractive institutions and non-market
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echanisms of resource allocation. Thus, a stagnated growth
rototype is generated and prevails with low performance
n entrepreneurship and innovation, and the economic pro-
otype can stagnate when creative destruction slows and is
haracterized by low innovation performance.
This stagnated growth prototype has no endogenous
nergy to overcome the barriers to growth. Institutions always
ffect preferences and vice versa, through the coevolution pat-
ern they follow, which can survive for a long time (Fig. 1).
hen a stagnated growth prototype prevails in an economy,
t can experience long periods of stagnation. These periods of
tagnation can be interrupted by waves  of imported growth
incoming capital and innovation) which can generate growth
pisodes. The speciﬁc requirements are not examined in this
aper.
onclusions  and  policy  implications
ome basic issues that concern the evolution of institutions
nd culture have been highlighted in this paper. The ultimate
oal of this paper was to describe what we referred to as the
erpetuating stagnated growth prototype – i.e. the economic
odel that does not place institutions and culture that pro-
ote innovations.
The stagnated growth prototype described in this paper isPlease cite this article in press as: Petrakis, P. E., et al. From an optimal to
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 general deﬁnition of a deviation from the optimal pattern,
n which idiosyncratic institutions and culture are generated.
owever, it is not the only possible form of deviation from opti-
ality. In any case, deviations from the optimal pattern affectwth prototype.
the speed of adjustment of the creative destruction process
and hence the innovation performance.
The stagnated growth pattern alters the core of Schum-
peter’s thoughts about the role of creative destruction.
Concerns about growth policy should be devoted to the
extent to which we can reach a growth performance pattern
with endogenous ability to generate growth. Consequently,
attention should be redirected to the planning and imple-
mentation of pro-growth structural changes with reference
to institutions and culture that would take into account
their coevolution process. Otherwise, we  must rely on the
importation of growth (i.e., inwards capital ﬂows or incom-
ing innovation), forming an exogenous pro-growth prototype
that promotes growth, entrepreneurship and innovations.
The question is how a stagnated growth pattern can be
transformed into an exogenous pro-growth pattern (optimal
growth pattern) that can promote innovation and growth. Do
we have to cure the sources of the generation of the devia-
tions from that canonical growth pattern or should we  impose
policies that will directly change existing institutions and
culture? From one perspective, the question concerning the
causes of the deviations from that canonical growth pattern
is meaningless since no one can reverse the path dependence
evolution. Thus, what we  can do is change the current state of
institutions. However, according to the coevolution principle,
institutions should change with the culture status. However,
culture changes at various speeds under speciﬁc circum- a stagnated growth prototype: The role of institutions and culture.
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stances even though generally cultural change is a long-term
process. But arguments exist that culture can change signiﬁ-
cantly after major economic shocks. Therefore, the question
is how institutions and culture can simultaneously change.
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Although clarity exists regarding the optimal direction and
means of institutional change, no clear idea exists regarding
how culture should change during institutional change. Thus
an institution-culture low growth trap can be avoided. How-
ever, achieving such a transformation is a much more  difﬁcult
task that requires detailed elaboration, something that can be
analyzed in future research.
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